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I. INTRODUCTION
November 8, 2018, started as any other morning would in the small Northern
California town of Paradise.1 However, in the early morning, a live wire broke
free of its grip causing a single customer power failure.2 A fire then broke out
near the broken wire.3 Rich Ellison, a resident of Paradise during the fire,
explained how people “got out with the clothes on their back and their
prescription meds and their slippers.”4 He further described the panic: “There
were people trapped in their cars that died and people that got out and ran
because it was a gridlock.”5 Fire engulfed the entire town within hours and
eventually killed eighty-five people, causing nearly seven billion dollars in
damage.6
California experienced some of its deadliest wildfires ever in 2017 and
2018.7 While Governor Newsom and the Legislature focus on the recovery of
companies like Pacific Gas & Electric (“PG&E”), the people of Paradise remain
in flux.8 “They feel like they don’t have a voice and there’s no one watching out
for them.”9 For the people of Paradise, recovery means rebuilding and moving
forward in any way possible.10
Chapter 79 is the most recent legislative response to wildfire-caused
destruction.11 The law aims to protect Californians by establishing tougher and
more extensive guidelines for the electrical companies associated with these

1. Ivan Penn, Peter Eavis & James Glanz, How PG&E Ignored Fire Risks in Favor of Profits, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/03/18/business/pge-california-wildfires.html
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Telephone Interview with Rich Ellison, a Paradise resident (June 24, 2019) (notes on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
5. Id.
6. Penn, Eavis & Glanz, supra note 1; Andrew Sheeler, These Three 2018 California Wildfires Caused
More Than $9 Billion in Damage, THE SACRAMENTO BEE (Dec. 12, 2018),
https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article222997430.html (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
7. Sheeler, supra note 6.
8. Taryn Luna, To Reduce Wildfires and Save Utilities, Newsom Wants $10.5 billion From Ratepayers,
L.A. TIMES (June 21, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-gavin-newsom-wildfire-utility-fund20190621-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Telephone Interview with Rich
Ellison, supra note 4.
9. Telephone Interview with Rich Ellison, supra note 4.
10. Id.
11. CAL. CIV. CODE § 311-8387 (amended by Chapter 79) (establishing greater regulatory framework to
protect ratepayers and force investor-owned utilities to enact greater safety precautions in order to access help
from the government to pay off wildfire liabilities).
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fires.12 It is part of a statewide, multi–year effort to combat the wildfires’
devastating impacts and to protect the state’s electrical infrastructure.13 This law
is a crucial step forward, yet it pushes pause by providing utilities a quick
financial fix in exchange for future promises of reform.14 Placing a band-aid on
the problem can only go so far.15 Chapter 79 sounds great in theory but
Californians need real solutions now, and not theoretical ones in the future.16
Real solutions for Californians would take a look at the cause of wildfires in
order to prevent them from happening in the first place.17
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Former Governor Jerry Brown commented that although “Californians
depend on reliable electrical power . . . costly wildfires . . . undermine this
system, leaving our energy sector in a state of weakness at a time when it should
be making even greater investments in safety.”18 California has a long history of
regulatory reform to protect and enhance this vital system.19 Section A explores
the regulatory agencies in charge of the energy markets.20 Section B explains the
basis for liability for investor-owned utilities.21 Section C looks into previous
wildfire-related litigation and how it impacted Chapter 79.22
A. Energy Regulatory Agencies
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) is an independent
federal regulatory agency in charge of regulating utility corporations.23 The
FERC oversees interstate transmission and the wholesale sale of energy in the
electric, gas, and oil industries.24 It also monitors the interstate energy systems
and oversees larger environmental concerns related to the natural gas and

12. CAL. CIV. CODE § 311-8387 (amended by Chapter 79).
13. GOVERNOR NEWSOM, CATASTROPHIC WILDFIRES, CLIMATE CHANGES AND OUR ENERGY FUTURE, 2
(2019).
14. CAL. CIV. CODE § 311-8387 (amended by Chapter 79).
15. CAL. CIV. CODE § 311-8387 (amended by Chapter 79); see infra Part IV.
16. CAL. CIV. CODE § 311-8387 (amended by Chapter 79); see infra Part IV.
17. CAL. CIV. CODE § 311-8387 (amended by Chapter 79); see infra Part IV.
18. Letter from Edmund G. Brown Jr., Governor of California, to Bill Dodd, Co-Chair of the Conference
Committee on Wildfire Preparedness and Response, and Chis Holden, Co-Chair of the Conference Committee
on Wildfire Preparedness and Response (July 24, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
19. Hearing on AB 1054 Before the S. Comm. on Approp., 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess., 4 (Cal. 2019)
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
20. See infra Part II.A.
21. See infra Part II.B.
22. See infra Part II.C.
23. What FERC Does, FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N (last updated Aug. 14, 2018),
https://www.ferc.gov/about/ferc-does.asp (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
24. Id.

411

2020 / The Aftermath of Devastating Wildfires for Utility Customers
electricity industry.25
At the state level, public utility commissions regulate utility operations.26 The
California Public Utilities Commission (“CPUC”) regulates California investorowned electric and natural gas utilities operating within the state.27 It sets the
prices and revenue standards for electrical utility companies.28
The CPUC’s main function is to determine the amount each utility can
collect from its customers.29 The charge includes the utility’s revenue
requirement, maintenance and operating costs, and power procurement.30 If an
electrical utility intends to increase its rates, the CPUC decides whether the
electrical utility can do so.31
B. Liability for Investor-Owned Utilities
Inverse condemnation is a legal doctrine that holds investor-owned utility
companies liable for the damage their equipment causes.32 This legal concept
entitles property owners to compensation if their property sustains damage in the
course of public use.33 Inverse condemnation is one avenue for utilities to pay
damages to victims because of their equipment.34
Inverse condemnation usually applies exclusively to government agencies
that damage private property while providing public services.35 The doctrine is
common, but the way California applies it is not.36 California grants investorowned utility companies the power to condemn private property using eminent
domain to construct infrastructure and operate their businesses.37 While investorowned electrical corporations are private corporations, they act as public entities
25. Id.
26. Utility Regulation and Policy, AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECONOMY,
https://aceee.org/topics/utility-regulation-and-policy (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
27.
Electric Costs, CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMM’N (last updated 2019),
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/Costs_Rates/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
28. Hearing on AB 1054 Before the S. Comm. on Approp., supra note 19, at 4.
29. Electric Costs, supra note 27.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Inverse Condemnation Fact Sheet, LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES AND CALIFORNIA STATE ASS’N
OF
COUNTIES
(last
accessed
Oct.
13,
2019),
https://www.counties.org/sites/main/files/fileattachments/inverse_condemnation_fact_sheet_league__csac.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. David R. Baker, The California Rule That Doomed PG&E: Inverse Condemnation, BLOOMBERG
(Jan. 15, 2019, 4:45 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-15/the-california-rule-thatdoomed-pg-e-inverse-condemnation (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
36. Id.
37. Inverse Condemnation and Utility Liability, CALIFORNIA STATE ASS’N OF COUNTIES (last accessed
Oct.
13,
2019),
http://www.counties.org/sites/main/files/fileattachments/csac_issue_brief_inverse_condemnation_7-25-18.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
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due to the nature of their services.38 Therefore, investor-owned electrical utilities
in California are strictly liable when the utility’s infrastructure causes the ignition
and the resulting damage.39
Caselaw in California established liability for investor-owned utility
companies under inverse condemnation.40 In Holtz v. Superior Court, the court
explained the reasoning for socializing these costs.41 The costs associated with
activities that generate public benefits should be “distribute[d] throughout the
community . . . to socialize the burden . . . that should be assumed by society.”42
Investor-owned utilities can socialize these costs through raising rates and
spreading costs on customers who benefit from the service.43 Because of this
doctrine, victims can recover their damages from these electrical corporations in
exchange for a dominant presence in California.44
C. Previous Wildfire Legislation
Chapter 79 is not the first law that California enacted to further regulate
electrical utilities.45 The 2001–2002 legislative session adopted AB 57 following
the 2000–2001 energy crisis.46 AB 57 provided guidance to electrical
corporations by requiring the CPUC review procurement plans of electrical
corporations.47 It came about to restore investor confidence after the energy
crisis.48 The procurement plans provided reliable and achievable standards to

38. Id.
39. CAROLYN KOUSKY, KATHERINE GREIG & BRETT LINGLE, FINANCING THIRD PARTY WILDFIRE
DAMAGES: OPTIONS FOR CALIFORNIA’S ELECTRIC UTILITIES, WHARTON RISK MGMT. & DECISION PROCESS
CTR. (2019).
40. See Gay Law Students Ass’n v. Pac. Telephone & Telegraph Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 599 (1979)
(finding that investor-owned utilities are more like government entities than private employers based on
regulation by the CPUC); see also Barham v. Southern California Edison Co., 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 424 (App. Div.
1999) (finding that investor-owned utilities are liable for damages caused from wildfires started by their
equipment under the doctrine of inverse condemnation because of the utility’s ability to condemn property
through eminent domain).
41. See Holtz v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d. 296, 303 (1970) (finding that plaintiffs should receive
compensation under Article I, Section 14 of the California Constitution for “any actual physical injury to real
property proximately caused by the improvement as deliberately designed and constructed” in accordance with
the principles of inverse condemnation).
42. Holtz, 3 Cal. 3d at 303.
43. KOUSKY, GREIG & LINGLE, supra note 39.
44. Id.
45. Southern California Edison Company, Comments on Order Instituting Rulemaking to Implement
Public Utilities Code Section 451.2 Regarding Criteria and Methodology for Wildfire Cost Recovery Pursuant
to
Senate
Bill
901,
at
3
(Feb.
11,
2019),
http://www3.sce.com/sscc/law/dis/dbattach5e.nsf/0/43A6A8DBE6435F278825839F0002C51A/$FILE/R19010
06-SCE%20Opening%20Comments%20on%20OIR.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
46. Id. at 11, 12.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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ensure stabilization in the state’s energy market to restore investors’
confidence.49
After the devastating 2017 and 2018 wildfires, the Legislature passed SB
901.50 Discussing the importance of the bill, then-Governor Brown explained,
“[w]ildfires in California aren’t going away, and we have to do everything
possible to prevent them.”51 Lawmakers hoped this bill would “prevent
catastrophic wildfires and protect Californians.”52 Senator Bill Dodd called it “a
comprehensive approach” to protect both victims of the devastation and utility
ratepayers.53
SB 901 requires that electric corporations provide and “submit wildfire
mitigation plans” to the CPUC.54 The plans should be comprehensive and
combine metrics from past fires as well as current guidelines from the CPUC.55
Once the CPUC approves the plan, the electrical corporation must comply with
its plan, objectives, and the CPUC’s timeline for such goals.56
SB 901 drastically changed the post–wildfire cost allocation process.57 The
CPUC now considers the financial status of a corporation in order to avoid
harming ratepayers or impacting its service when determining the maximum
amount it should pay.58 The law created a “stress-test”: how far can the CPUC
push an electrical corporation without risking service interpretations or
negatively impacting ratepayers.59
Both SB 901 and AB 57 had a common theme: preparedness and
thoughtfulness benefit all parties and create a more stable and reliable service
provider.60 SB 901 specifically paved the avenue for further legislative action to

49. Id.
50. Hearing on AB 1054 Before the S. Comm. on Approp., supra note 19, at 11.
51. Alexei Koseff, Your Utility Bill Could Reflect Fire Costs Under New California Law, THE
SACRAMENTO BEE (Sept. 21, 2018, 11:59 AM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitolalert/article218803990.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
52. Judy Lin & Laurel Rosenhall, Jerry Brown Signed $1 billion in Wildfire Prevention-and None of it
Applies to the Fires This Year, CALMATTERS (Nov. 14, 2018), https://calmatters.org/articles/california-wildfireprevention-bill-issues/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
53. Ben Adler, What The Heck is in California’s Wildfire Liability Law that Lawmakers are Voting On
Friday Night?, CAPITAL PUBLIC RADIO (Aug. 31, 2018), http://www.capradio.org/articles/2018/08/31/what-theheck-is-in-californias-wildfire-liability-rule-that-lawmakers-are-voting-on-friday-night/ (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
54. Southern California Edison Company, supra note 45, at 13.
55. Id.
56. Southern California Edison Company, supra note 45, at 13; Utility Wildfire Mitigation Plans (SB
901), CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMM’N (May 30, 2019), https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/sb901/ (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review).
57. SB 901 – Conference Committee Report Bill Summary, CALIFORNIA STATE ASS’N OF COUNTIES
(Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.counties.org/sites/main/files/file-attachments/sb_901_bill_summary_csac_8-3118.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Southern California Edison Company, supra note 45, at 13.
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create a more comprehensive framework to protect such a vital industry.61
III. CHAPTER 79
Chapter 79 aims to mitigate the economic impact that catastrophic wildfires
have on both California residents and society as a whole.62 It accomplishes this
by implementing strict safety procedures to help the impacted electrical utility
companies recover from the debilitating recovery costs.63 Chapter 79 follows SB
901’s path and takes greater steps to establish a more regimented process for cost
recovery and future safety implementation.64 Assembly Member Chris Holden
described how Chapter 79 “will pave the way for very important changes in how
we address wildfires in California.”65 The law “provides certainty for the markets
to protect the utilities and provides certainty for fire victims.”66
Chapter 79’s goal is to establish a regulatory foundation that would shield
electrical utilities from potentially crippling liabilities without harming
ratepayers.67 Chapter 79 gives utilities strict requirements to avoid burdening
customers with resolving cost issues and implementing future safety
enhancements.68
The crux of Chapter 79 is a wildfire fund, which will provide faster recovery
to victims by paying eligible claims arising from a covered wildfire.69 The
wildfire fund’s main idea is to reduce ratepayer costs while still providing the
necessary capital for electrical corporations to pay of liabilities.70 The fund
supports the credit worthiness of the corporations by attracting capital for
investment in safe and reliable power.71
To access the fund, an electrical corporation must earn an annual safety
certification from the CPUC before the approaching wildfire season.72 A
corporation must tie executive compensation to its safety performance.73 This

61. SB 901 – Conference Committee Report Bill Summary, supra note 57.
62. CAL. CIV. CODE § 311–8387 (amended by Chapter 79).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Taryn Luna, Utility Customers Will Pay $10.5 billion for California Wildfire Costs Under Bill Sent to
Newsom, L.A. TIMES (July 11, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-wildfire-fund-gavin-newsom20190711-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
66. Id.
67. J.D. Morris, California lawmakers move to implement Newsom’s utility wildfire plan, S.F.
CHRONICLE (June 28, 2019), https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/California-lawmakers-proposelegislation-to-14058832.php (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
68. Id.
69. Hearing on AB 1054 Before the S. Comm. on Approp., supra note 19, at 8.
70. Id. at 2.
71. Id. at 2, 12.
72. Hearing on AB 1054 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Util. and Energy, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess., 5,
(Cal. 2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
73. Id.
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safety certification could include enacting safety committees on its boards of
directors to help a company’s ability to implement a wildfire mitigation plan.74
Further, a corporation must invest $5 billion into safety plans and cannot profit
from this investment.75 Under previous law, state regulators would grant a return
on the investment.76
Initially the state’s Surplus Money Investment Fund will provide money for
the wildfire fund through a loan.77 After this initial funding, electrical
corporations themselves will contribute to the fund annually through a
combination of ratepayer contribution and shareholder investment.78 The law
supplements funding with $10.5 billion in ratepayer expenses through a
mandatory $2.50 additional monthly charge.79
An electrical corporation must make an initial investment-which varies with
the size of the corporation-on top of its annual contribution to access the fund.80
After a large electrical corporation makes an initial contribution of $7.5 billion,
it then makes annual contributions of $300 million.81 A regional electrical
corporation makes an initial contribution of $625 multiplied by the number of
accounts it services, the company then makes annual contributions of $25
measured by the same metric.82 The courts must approve PG&E’s participation.83
In order to participate, the company must exit its bankruptcy process by June 30,
2020 without raising rates to customers.84
Chapter 79 requires the CPUC to determine whether an electrical
corporation’s ignition-related conduct should allow cost recovery for wildfire

74. Id.
75. The Times Editorial Board, California is Inexplicably Racing to Pass a Badly Vetted Wildfire Bill,
L.A. TIMES (July 10, 2019, 3:10 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-wildfire-fund-rush20190710-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
76. Hearing on AB 1054 Before the S. Comm. on Approp., supra note 19, at 1.
77. CAL. CIV. CODE § 311–8387 (amended by Chapter 79); see generally State of California Manual of
State
Funds,
DEP’T
OF
FINANCE
(revised
Aug.
2012),
http://dof.ca.gov/budget/Manual_State_Funds/Find_a_Fund/documents/0681.pdf (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review) (explaining that the Surplus Money Investment Fund is “[m]oneys of various funds on
deposit in the State Treasury are transferred for investment purposes”).
78. CAL. CIV. CODE § 311–8387 (amended by Chapter 79).
79. Luna, supra note 65; see generally Bryan Anderson, Will Utility Rates Go Up? What California’s
$26 Billion Wildfire Plan Means for You, THE SACRAMENTO BEE (July 12, 2019),
https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article232603792.html (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (“When California experienced an energy crisis in 2001, the state
imposed a $2.50-a-month charge on customers of investor-owned utilities. That fee was set to expire next year.
But under the new law Newsom signed, it will be extended another 15 years”).
80. CAL. CIV. CODE § 311–8387 (amended by Chapter 79).
81. See id. (“‘Large electrical corporation’ means an electrical corporation with 250,000 or more
customer accounts within the state”).
82. See id. (“‘Regional electrical corporation’ means an electrical corporation with less than 250,000
customer accounts within the state’”).
83. CATASTROPHIC WILDFIRES, CLIMATE CHANGES AND OUR ENERGY FUTURE, supra note 13, at 9.
84. Luna, supra note 65.
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damage liabilities.85 Ultimately, reasonable conduct predicates cost recovery for
electrical corporations.86 The conduct was reasonable if it was consistent with
actions a reasonable utility would undertake in good faith in the same or similar
circumstances.87 An electrical corporation must show by a preponderance of the
evidence that its conduct was reasonable in order to recover costs.88 The
corporation automatically satisfies the reasonableness requirement if it had a
valid safety certification during the wildfire.89
A party to the action can rebut the presumption of reasonable conduct by
creating a serious doubt as to the reasonableness of a corporation’s actions.90 The
burden then shifts back to the corporation to ultimately prove its conduct was
reasonable.91 If a corporation did behave unreasonably, then it would have to
reimburse the fund through a predetermined amount based on its operating size.92
Chapter 79 changes the standards of evaluating electrical utility to encourage
better fire mitigation practices while simultaneously providing the necessary
capital these companies need to move forward.93
IV. ANALYSIS
Governor Newsom noted in his Strike Force report on California’s wildfire
status that “[w]ildfires are not only more frequent but far more devastating.”94
Without action to address this changing status quo, the state faces another energy
crisis.95 However, Chapter 79 simply buys the Legislature time to come up with
more sustainable, long-term solutions to combat deadly wildfires.96 Section A
looks into the causes of wildfires.97 Section B analyzes the costs associated with
utility-ignited wildfires.98 Section C explores future practices utility companies

85. Hearing on AB 1054 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Util. and Energy, supra note 72, at 1.
86. Id. at 1–2.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 2.
89. Hearing on AB 1054 Before the S. Comm. on Approp., supra note 19, at 12.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Hearing on AB 1054 Before the S. Comm. on Approp., supra note 19, at 12; see Luna, supra note 65
(explaining how the law limits a company’s risk exposure through a 20% cap on payment).
93. CAL. CIV. CODE § 311–8387 (amended by Chapter 79); Luna, supra note 65.
94. Wildfires and Climate Change: California’s Energy Future, Governor Newsom’s Strike Force (Apr.
12,
2019),
https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Wildfires-and-Climate-ChangeCalifornia%E2%80%99s-Energy-Future.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
95. GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF PLANNING AND RESEARCH, Final Report of the Commission on
Catastrophic Wildfire Cost and Recovery (2019), available at http://opr.ca.gov/docs/20190618Commission_on_Catastrophic_Wildfire_Report_FINAL_for_transmittal.pdf
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
96. Id.
97. See infra Part IV.A.
98. See infra Part IV.B.
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can take to mitigate wildfire risk.99
A. What Causes Wildfires?
On average, more than 70,000 wildfires burn about 7,000,000 acres of land
in the United States each year.100 In 2019 alone 1,349 wildfires burned around
12,000 acres of land in the Golden State.101 Multiple factors contribute to the
unusual amount of fires California sees.102 Forest mismanagement is one of the
factors, as California does not clear enough of the brush that builds up year after
year.103 Tough winter weather knocks down trees, leading to brush overgrowth
that dries out over summer and becomes excellent kindling.104 “Wind, humidity,
and vegetation” primarily drive fire behavior.105
Although environmental factors set the stage, humans cause a majority of
California’s wildfires-from “an arsonist lighting up a hillside” to a truck releasing
a spark.106 Utility-ignited wildfires do not account for all human-ignited
wildfires, but electrical infrastructure plays a vital role in California’s wildfire
threat.107 While electrical power only sparks about 9.4% of wildfires, this is
something utility companies could avoid altogether.108 In three and a half years,
equipment of California’s three largest utilities ignited more than 2,000 wildfires
within the state.109 Additionally, PG&E admitted that one of its transmission lines
99. See infra Part IV.C.
100.
Claire
Wolters,
Climate
101:
Wildfire,
NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/natural-disasters/wildfires/ (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
101. Jasmine Aguilera, During Record-Breaking Heat Wave, California Sees Nearly 240 Wildfires
Within a Week, TIME (June 13, 2019), https://time.com/5604644/california-wildfires-heat-wave/ (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review).
102. See Kendra Pierre-Louis, Why Does California Have So Many Wildfires?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/09/climate/why-california-fires.html (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review) (listing the multiple factors that contribute to the wildfires, including California’s
climate, human acts, fire suppression actions that make modern fires worse, and the Santa Ana winds).
103. Matt Simon, Blame Utilities for Wildfires, but Blame Everyone Else Too, WIRED (June 14, 2019,
7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/utilities-wildfires/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
104.
Kimberly Veklerov, What Causes wildfires?, S.F. CHRONICLE (May 31, 2019),
https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/How-California-s-biggest-wildfires-ignited-13907244.php (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Taryn Luna, California Utility Equipment Sparked More Than 2,000 Fires in Over Three Years,
L.A. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-california-utilities-wildfires-regulators20190128-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); see generally Doyle Rice, How
Do Wildfires Start? All It Takes Is a Spark, USA TODAY (Nov. 13, 2018),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2018/11/13/california-fires-how-do-wildfires-start-they-gettingworse/1987691002/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining the perfect conditions
for wildfire risk that include hot, dry summers with below average precipitation).
108. Veklerov, supra note 104.
109. Luna, supra note 107.
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sparked the Camp Fire.110 These same lines were incredibly old, further
increasing the wildfire risk.111 Old electrical infrastructure in these areas plays a
major role in sparking these fires.112
A recent report showed that PG&E delayed work on its lines that were in the
worst shape to focus on other problems-despite knowing the risk.113 Specifically,
the company knew the Caribou-Palermo line, which caused the Camp Fire,
needed work-but the company delayed safety inspections for more than five
years.114 Despite age and structural integrity concerns, PG&E never performed
any maintenance.115 This lack of action came to fruition in Paradise.116
Wind and heat aside, the real cause of California’s worst electrical utilityignited wildfires is a lack of oversight.117 In 2010, PG&E hired Quanta
Technology to assess the age and condition of its transmission structures.118
While the firm found 90% of the towers were over 60 years old and the company
should do routine checks on them, PG&E did nothing.119 PG&E showed that
California cannot rely on electrical utility companies to stop wildfires on their
own without government intervention.120
Just because something is old does not mean it needs fixing.121 However, it
does mean that it needs surveillance and routine maintenance.122 Chapter 79
attempts to solve this by allowing cost recovery through reasonable actions,
which would certainly include maintenance and inspections.123 Yet, Chapter 79
offers nothing more than a promise to Californians that electrical utilities will
change.124 Lawmakers can only hope corporations buy-in and adhere to the
provisions laid out in Chapter 79 until California creates more serious plans
moving forward.125 In the meantime, Californians will be holding their breath as
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the state enters another fire season.126
B. Who Actually Pays for Wildfires?
In addition to the physical destruction and emotional toll, wildfires carry
overwhelming financial costs.127 The government, citizens, firefighters, and local
business owners all bear these costs.128 Chapter 79 poses as a consumer
protection law, even though it focuses on electrical utilities’ costs after a fire.129 It
promises future reform in exchange for money now.130 Money, however, can
only come from so many places.131 While Chapter 79 promises that market
stability now will increase investment and reduce costs for ratepayers, there is no
guarantee this plan will work.132
Chapter 79 originated from the fear that Wall Street would turn its back on
the electrical utility companies after massive liabilities bankrupted them.133 Many
ratings agencies threatened to downgrade the companies’ credit ratings to junk
bond status if the Legislature did nothing.134 Lower credit rating means less
investment, which in turn means ratepayers alone front the utilities’ operating
and maintenance costs.135
Chapter 79 is a band-aid that provides necessary capital right now to prevent
against a potential future collapse.136 The new law keeps utility companies
solvent to keep Californians’ lights on.137 Protecting ratepayers and the electrical
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utilities is ideal, but both parties likely cannot win simultaneously.138 This
unprecedented new law “speaks to the immense financial threat” that electrical
companies face in the wake of these fires.139
PG&E faces roughly $30 billion in liabilities from the last two fire
seasons.140 Its liability insurance protected the company up to only $1.4 billion
beginning August 1, 2018.141 While the utility listed $71.4 billion in assets and
nearly $51.7 billion in debts, the company’s liabilities could eventually exceed its
market value, which continues to decline.142 Potentially, PG&E could become
insolvent paying off its liabilities.143 That is where Chapter 79 steps in.144
The wildfire fund provides immediate capital to pay off PG&E’s liabilities
and keep the electrical utility afloat.145 If a utility follows the safety plans and
acts reasonably, it can tap into the fund if its infrastructure sparks a fire.146 If a
utility fails to act reasonably, it will pay off its liabilities without aid from the
fund.147 However, someone still has to pay for these liabilities.148 Shifting
liability simply transfers costs to another party.149 It does not eliminate them.150
Unfortunately, it seems ratepayers will pay for wildfires either way.151 If the
utility acts reasonably, ratepayers pay for just and reasonable costs.152 Otherwise,
ratepayers still contribute to the fund via the $2.50 standard charge on their
monthly bills.153 Chapter 79 ultimately requires ratepayers to pay more now in an
effort to pay less later.154 Regardless of when someone must pay, ratepayers and
wildfire victims still pay for utility-ignited wildfires despite ratepayers’ lack of
involvement in causing responsibility for the fire.155
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Chapter 79 is the “least-worst option for utility customers.”156 Ideally, the
fund shifts the burden of wildfire liabilities from ratepayers to shareholders so
ratepayers are not alone paying for liabilities through potentially crippling rate
increases.157 Preemptively addressing the issue of financial viability saves
ratepayers from providing even more money if a utility company’s credit ratings
tumble.158 However, just because utilities do not pay the liabilities does not mean
that they magically go away.159
Unfortunately, lawmakers need time to work on long-term solutions in order
to find meaningful changes.160 But time means money and that money has to
come from somewhere.161 Steven Weissman, a lecturer at UC Berkeley, noted
that “[d]ollars have to come from somewhere. It’s either ratepayers, taxpayers,
shareholders or victims. As these wildfires might pile up, you’re going to reach a
point . . . where either ratepayers can’t pay their bills, shareholders won’t buy the
stock and on down the line . . . What a bill like this does is buys a little time.”162
Buying time will only work if lawmakers and electrical utilities use that time
wisely.163 If customers pay for anything, they should pay for actual
improvements, not a promise for improvements.164
C. Potential Solutions
California’s changing landscape calls for a new approach to how the state
handles wildfires.165 Chapter 79 provides a financial buffer for utilities and
lawmakers while they find more permanent fire mitigation solutions.166 Longterm solutions require time, but these solutions should actually prevent wildfires
from happening if anything is going to change.167 Subsection 1 talks about how
utility companies can update their current practices.168 Subsection 2 explores the
process of undergrounding power lines to mitigate fire risk.169 Subsection 3
examines employing Public Safety Power Shutoffs as a long-term solution.170
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1. Updating Current Mitigation Practices
In response to newly-mandated wildfire mitigation plans, utilities should
look for alternatives to comply with safety regulations and decrease wildfire
risk.171 Updating current infrastructure should be the first option a utility
proposes in its mitigation plans.172
After the recent increase in deadly wildfires, Southern California Edison
plans to replace roughly 3,500 miles of overhead power lines with new, insulated
wires to reduce spark risk.173 Since the Camp Fire, PG&E upgraded its current
mitigation practices by implementing new technology and conducting more
intensive review of its existing infrastructure.174 PG&E plans to trim and or
remove roughly 375,000 trees around its distribution lines in 2019.175 Conducting
more extensive inspections of the distribution poles and transmission structures
would provide additional sources of security for PG&E, especially with its older
lines.176 The utility plans to replace bare overhead wires with covered conductors
and replace existing equipment with certified low-fire-risk equipment.177 PG&E
plans on taking even further proactive steps by upgrading transformers to operate
with more fire-resistant fluids, and install more fire-resistant poles.178
A utility company’s practices of investigating its own infrastructure needs
changing too.179 Technological advancements, like real-time weather monitoring
and aerial drone patrols could give more accurate and current information on
weather and vegetation conditions.180 While the total cost of these measures is
unknown, technology can prevent fires by identifying risks and trends in greater,
more geographically localized detail.181
Working with existing infrastructure and updating the current system is
likely the best option for immediate relief.182 Implementing “proper vegetation
171. PAC. GAS & ELEC. CO., PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY AMENDED 2019 WILDFIRE SAFETY
PLAN (2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
172. Id.
173. California Utility Replacing Thousands Of Miles Of Power Lines To Reduce Wildfire Risk, CBS SF
BAY AREA (Sept. 10, 2018), https://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2018/09/10/ca-utility-replacing-1000s-of-milesof-power-lines-to-reduce-wildfire-risk/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
174. See Luna, supra note 139 (outlining PG&E’s new mitigation practices, which include installing new
localized weather monitoring stations and high-definition cameras that spot wildfires, even though the latter
plan is optional according to the company).
175. Matthew S. Schwartz, PG&E Could Shut Off Power For Millions To Prevent Wildfires, NPR (Feb.
7, 2019, 5:08 AM ET), https://www.npr.org/2019/02/07/692249102/millions-could-lose-power-under-pg-esplan-to-prevent-wildfires (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
176. Id.
177. PAC. GAS & ELEC. CO., PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY AMENDED 2019 WILDFIRE SAFETY
PLAN, supra note 171.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Luna, supra note 107.
181. Id.
182. PAC. GAS & ELEC. CO., PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY AMENDED 2019 WILDFIRE SAFETY

423

2020 / The Aftermath of Devastating Wildfires for Utility Customers
management practices, replacing wooden poles with steel, concrete, or composite
ones, or reinforcing utility poles with guy wires” could be just as effective as
other methods.183 Unfortunately, for a company like PG&E, this is a much larger
task than it seems.184
PG&E has over 100,000 circuit miles of electric distribution lines and
roughly 18,500 circuit miles of interconnected transmission lines.185 Updating
these lines would take immense amounts of man power, money, and time.186
PG&E noted that performing routine inspections and cutting back on vegetation
could cost $75 billion.187 After all the upgrading, when does it become infeasible
for a utility to keep fixing a broken system of older power lines rather than
finding better permanent replacement?188
2. Undergrounding Power Lines
A popular and common alternative to using overhead wires is putting them
underground.189 Undergrounding is the process of placing electric infrastructure
underground in trenches.190 Burying lines can drastically reduce exposure to
weather conditions that cause fires while increasing reliability during these firecausing conditions.191 Nationally, roughly 25% of newly installed distribution
and transmission lines are underground.192
Undergrounding seems like an obvious solution, yet it is the most
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complicated and expensive option.193 A PG&E spokesperson noted that
“[u]ndergrounding power lines is not a silver bullet that solves all of these
problems.”194 On average, burying lines costs about ten times more than stringing
them overhead.195 Undergrounding lines costs roughly $1 million per mile,
depending on geography and population density.196 And, due to California’s
population distribution between densely populated cities and rural areas, serving
the entire state would likely take significantly more cable.197
North Carolina explored undergrounding its power lines after devastating ice
storms ravaged the state in 2002.198 The project never began because the state
projected it “would take 25 years to complete and increase electricity rates by
125%.”199 Most states that explore this alternative ultimately reject
undergrounding because of the prejudicial financial impact it has on
customers.200
Undergrounding power lines complicates a utility’s ability to detect problems
with the line.201 “When power lines are underground, it’s more difficult to locate
the source of the outage. It takes more time to repair.”202 Underground power
lines are less accessible, which prolongs the duration of outages.203 Even if
utilities do bury their lines, underground lines are still susceptible to weather
exposure as overhead feeders control most of the underground systems.204
While undergrounding power lines mitigates risk from debris and weather
exposure, it does not completely eliminate that risk.205 Burying lines can make
them more prone to damage from other severe types of weather, but common fire
areas might not experience such conditions.206 High flood or moisture areas
would likely need retrofitted lines to handle such conditions.207
The massive expense of undergrounding is a real concern for companies
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already facing insolvency.208 Given the cost of converting existing overhead lines
to underground, it might not be possible to completely bury an entire power
system.209 Utilities and the CPUC should explore burying lines in high-fire risk
areas.210
Each utility should compare the cost of undergrounding with the cost to
participate in Chapter 79’s wildfire fund when determining alternatives moving
forward.211 By comparison, San Diego Gas & Electric (“SDG&E”) will pay its
4.3% share, roughly $450 million, to join the fund.212 Southern California Edison
agreed to pay an initial $2.4 billion to join the fund, as did PG&E, which will pay
roughly $4.8 billion to opt into the fund.213 These investments are substantial, but
a company should consider this cost to the cost of partially or entirely
undergrounding its system when searching for alternatives moving forward.214
3. Public Safety Power Shutoffs
Utility companies shut off power during high-risk fire weather conditions via
Public Safety Power Shutoffs (“PSPS”).215 Shutting off power is a quick and
controllable solution to imminent fire danger.216 Earlier in the year, PG&E cut
power to 21,000 residents for two days because of high-risk fire conditions.217
Since 2013, SDG&E conducted thirteen PSPSs and has not had a major fire in
those present years.218 The key to PSPSs is to have people on the ground who
monitor the lines.219 SDG&E also has an in-house meteorology team observing
temperature, humidity, and wind speed at its stations across the state.220 These
safety measures are intensive and inconvenient but, when done correctly, can be
successful.221
While shutting off the power is the quickest, most immediate response to
high-risk fire weather conditions, it is a last resort for utilities.222 A SDG&E
spokesperson pointed out that “even after the wind dies down you can’t just turn
the power back on right away.”223 Shutting off power to large areas poses great
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dangers of its own.224 PSPS’s curb fire risk by cutting off power to critical
infrastructure.225 However, medical facilities, museums, grocery stores, and
schools are some examples of community resources that could not operate
without any power.226
This proactive approach might solve immediate problems but is not enough
on its own solve the wildfire crisis.227 There are major dangers associated with
cutting off power to a society that requires access to electricity.228 This temporary
solution is not preferable or even reliable, because California should be looking
for long-term fire risk mitigation.229
V. CONCLUSION
The wildfires in 2017 and 2018 killed 139 people, destroyed communities,
and changed the lives of tens of thousands of Californians.230 “Those people are
gone and it can’t be replaced and that’s the sad part right there . . . they’ve lost
everything.”231 Wildfires will still exist, but that does not mean the Legislature
should not continue to act to prevent future wildfires.232 While utility companies
can create safer and more reliable power distribution systems, one solution is not
enough to permanently stop wildfires.233 Nevertheless, there is a problem when
the system that powers communities across California is the same system that
simultaneously destroys them.234 Fires will never stop, but the government and
businesses can take steps to prevent them.235
There is no question the Legislature had to act or risk facing another serious
energy crisis.236 In theory, Chapter 79 appears effective: help ratepayers by
allowing quick victim recovery while simultaneously incentivizing greater safety
measures.237 In reality, the bill just provides a cushion for the Legislature and
electrical utilities to create better measures and practices for mitigating fire risk
moving forward.238 There is no way to know whether the 2017 and 2018
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wildfires were outliers or the new normal.239 Californians would hope though that
such a buffer would allow time for a utility to implement meaningful change.240
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